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Abstract
In this work we study the impact on the size of the informal sector
of a tax levied on formal workers, and transfers that may be distributed
to both formal and informal workers alike. We build a search model
that features an informal sector and we calibrate it to data from Mex-
ico. We investigate whether changes in size and distribution of transfers
between formal and informal workers have a significant impact on the
size of the informal sector.
We find that changes in the distribution, for a given size, create a range
of variation of 19.35pp. Analogously, changes in size create a range
of variation of 5.7pp, resulting in a total range of variation of 51.2pp.
This implies that it is possible to substantially increase formalization
by rising extra tax resources as long as they accrue to formal workers.
We illustrate the validity of our approach simulating the introduction
of Seguro Popular.
Keywords: Informal Sector, Search, Tax and Transfer Programs, Seguro
Popular
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1 Introduction
The informal sector accounts for a large share of employment in many low-
income and middle-income countries. Not firms that operate in the informal
sector, nor their workers, pay taxes or social contributions 1. As a consequence,
informal workers are not enrolled in social security. A common reaction of
many governments has been to introduce transfer programs directed to the
informal sector to alleviate their lack of protection. In this paper we examine
these type of policies to answer the following question: Can changes in taxes
and transfers reduce the size of the informal sector?
As in Rauch (1991,) Edwads and Cox (2002,) and Amaral and Quintin
(2006) we assume that belonging to the informal sector is a choice. Therefore,
the size of the informal sector is the product of preferences and opportunities
available to workers. Taxes are a strong set of incentives that may discourage
labor supply and employment creation in the formal sector. Similarly, trans-
fers that are conditional on worker’s choices influence their decisions. We try
to quantitatively assess the importance of this mechanism.
Our work focuses on how changes in the size of transfers and its distribu-
tion between formal and informal workers may impact the size of the informal
sector. For example, imagine that 30% of transfers are currently given to infor-
mal workers (say through “Seguro Popular,” which guarantees health coverage
to families that are poor and informal in Mexico.) What would be the effect
on the size of the informal sector of changing the size or generosity of transfers,
holding the distribution of transfers between formal and informal workers con-
stant? If transfers are biased towards formal workers, increasing their size will
likely increase (decrease) the size of the formal (informal) sector. Nonetheless,
this is a quantitative question. On the other hand, what would be the effect
on the size of the informal sector if we were to split transfers between formal
1Despite what many people believe, the informal sector is included in national accounts
statistics. The informal sector is measured using employment and micro-business surveys
(See UN-SNA 1993).
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and informal workers equally, holding the size of taxes and transfers constant?
That would be akin to universalizing transfers such as health insurance. We
find big effects on the distribution of employment between the formal and the
informal sector.
To answer to these question we build a stylized search model in the spirit
of McCall (1970.) The model features four different labor market states:
employment-unemployment in the formal sector, and employment-unemployment
in the informal sector. Every period an unemployed worker gets to draw a wage
from both sectors2 and decides whether to accept an offer, if any at all. Offers
arrive as a Poisson’s process. Employed workers may loose their job with some
sector specific probability and go back to the pool of unemployed. Through
distributing transfers across sectors and employment statuses, we can change
the value of each choice to a forward looking worker. We calibrate the model
to the Mexican economy, because it is a country with roughly 50% of the em-
ployed population working for the informal sector and it has fairly good data.
However, our model could be used to assess the role of taxes and transfers in
other countries, which would give a nice empirical validation or refutation of
our work. In this paper we perform an exercise of validation using data from
the introduction of Seguro Popular in Mexico.
In our benchmark calibration, we find that keeping the size of the tax and
transfer system to 7% of GDP3, changes in its distribution between formal and
informal workers produces a range of variation in the size of the informal sector
of 19.35pp. On the other hand, setting the distribution of the tax and transfer
system to 30% of transfers, and changing its size produces a range of variation
of 5.7pp. When we vary simultaneously its generosity and its distribution we
produce a range of variation of 51.2pp at most, which is well beyond the cross
country variation in the size of the informal sector.
2Each sector’s distribution features a different mean and variance
3Which is roughly what the Mexican economy has been spending on social security and
social transfers.
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To illustrate the way our model can generate changes in informality when
taxes and transfers are modified, we use the case of the recently introduced
Seguro Popular in Mexico. This program is specifically designed to provide
health services to informal workers. As a result, public health expenditures
increased from 2.6% of GDP in 2004 (before the introduction of the program)
to 3.1% in 2011 (after full implementation of the program). Moreover, the
share of public health spending to informal workers increased from 30% of
total spending to 45%. Thus we have a change in size and distribution of
transfers. Our model predicts that this program added 1.6pp to the informal
sector size. This value is consistent with the empirical evidence found by other
researchers (Azuara and Marinescu (2011,) and Bosch and Campos-Vasquez
(2010,) among others.) This exercise also delivers an important lesson: tak-
ing into account the size of transfers is crucial to understand the response of
informality to changes in its distribution.
Our work is related to Albretch et al. (2009) and Bosch & Pretel (2011.)
Both build a model similar to Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) but featuring
an informal sector. In Albretch et al. (2009) workers differ ex-ante in their
human capital. This is a key force to self select into unemployment or em-
ployment in either sector. Albretch et al. (2009) find that depending on their
human capital there are three types of workers: those who will choose formal
employment only, those who will choose informal employment only and a type
of worker who would have spells into formal sector and informal sector indif-
ferently. They study what would be the effect of changing severance payments
and payroll taxes on the size of the informal sector. Compared to them, we
assume that workers are ex-ante identical. As all workers are identical in our
economy, the only source of selection into formal or informal sector is workers’
perceptions of what taxes would they have to pay and what transfers would
they get in each sector. We also assume we differentiate that unemployment
depends on the sector of origin, and we provide a characterization of the tax
and transfer system in greater detail. Bosch & Pretel (2011) build a model
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that is closer to ours. Abstracting from the many differences in details our
objective is similar, which is to measure the effects that taxes and transfers
may have on the size of the informal sector. They focus on unemployment
insurance, whereas we focus on a stylized tax and transfer system.
Our work is also related to a growing literature that studies the relation-
ship between informality and aggregate outcomes. This literature, emphasizes
that the fact that the informal sector is unregulated does not mean that it
comes without a cost to society. At a basic level, it represents a fiscal chal-
lenge as it shrinks the potential tax base. But the informal sector may also
be a barrier to economic growth and development. Informality has been re-
lated in the literature to low productivity (Cavalcanty & Antunes (2007,)
Leal-Ordon˜ez (2009) and Moscoso & Erasmo (2010),) low human capital (La
Porta & Shleifer (2008)) and higher inequality (Chong & Gradstein (2004) and
Dessy & Pallage (2001.)) Thus, our results indicate that a way to reduce in-
formality and enhance growth is through a better design of taxes and transfers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some key statistics
computed from the 3rd and 4th quarters from ENOE 2010 and ENIGH-MCS4.
These statistics will be key to our calibration. Section 3 lays down the model.
Section 4 explains the calibration procedure to fit the statistics presented in
section 2. Section 5 presents results from our numerical experiments and sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Framework
In this section we describe the structure of transfers in Mexico and present
some important statistics that will be later used in our calibration. It is worth
pointing out that, to some extent, these features are shared by many low-
4“Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos - Modulo de condiciones socioecono´micas”:
National Survey of Health and Expenditures - Socio-Economic Conditions Module
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income and middle-income countries, particularly in Latin America. We focus
on Mexico because it has a large informal sector and statistics are of good
quality. However, we believe that our model can be successfully used to other
countries if similar data were available.
We need two kinds of data. We need data on transitions of workers between
formal and informal sectors, labor force statuses (employed and unemployed)
and wages. For this, we use third and fourth quarters of Encuesta Nacional
de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE) which has a rotating panel structure and it
is representative at the national level. Using ENOE we construct transition
probabilities and its induced stationary distribution of workers. We need data
on transfers as well, as it will be important in our calibration the size of the
transfer system and how those transfers are distributed between formal and
informal workers. We use a combination of data sources.
2.1 Evidence from ENOE
We use data on employment and wages from 3rd and 4th quarters of ENOE.
To define what an informal worker is, we use a question that inquires whether
the worker is enrolled in Mexican social security (Mexican Institute of Social
Security or IMSS.) Under the Mexican Law, employers are responsible to en-
roll workers into social security, but employers themselves are not required to
enroll in the IMSS, nor self-employed. Therefore we drop employers and self
employed from our data5.
We define a formal employee as one that is paying social contributions.
Unemployment by sector is defined by tracking workers in the sample that
were formal (informal) employees and suffered a unemployment spell. Table 1
shows the transition from employment to unemployment across sectors, where
eF,t, eI,t, uF,t and uI,t indicate the sector which a worker belongs to, in quarter
t.
5Extending ours analysis to self employment decisions would be a natural extension of
our model, we leave it for future research.
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Table 1. Labor Market Transition Matrix
eF,t+1 eI,t+1 uF,t+1 uI,t+1
eF,t .87 .10 .03 0
eI,t .08 .88 0 .04
uF,t .41 .30 .29 0
uI,t .20 .62 0 .18
Naming this matrix as P we can find the stationary distribution of em-
ployment and unemployment by sector that this matrix implies. Using some
linear algebra we can find it by solving:
(I − P )v = 0
where v is an eigenvector.6 Table 2 shows the stationary distribution of em-
ployment and unemployment across sectors. We also provide information on
averages and standard deviations of wages per hour.
Table 2. Labor Force Statistics
Sector e∗ u∗ µw σw
F .419 .024 31.69 31.63
I .539 .025 21.06 24.24
According to our data, informal employment is 56.2% of total employment.
We also find an aggregate unemployment rate of 5%, that divides equally across
sectors. As it would be expected, average wages and the standard deviations
are higher for formal workers than informal workers. Note that these are
differences in observed wages. Later we find that the underlying distributions
from which workers draw wage offers is rather different, which allows us to
correct for selection bias, using our structural model.
6Alternatively, we could have used an average of the distribution of workers in the ENOE
data. Both methods give similar numbers.
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2.2 Size and distribution of transfers
Mexico has two competing transfer systems: social security and social trans-
fers. Social security transfers are those provided by IMSS and consist of health
insurance, retirement pensions, disability insurance, housing loans, work risk
and injury insurance, day care services, sports and cultural facilities and life
insurance. These transfers are funded through a payroll tax that we assume
constant and we set to match the share of transfers over GDP in our calibra-
tion7. One of the main features of this transfer system is that transfers are
bundled so either you get all transfers or none. Therefore we can sum their
cash value and use it as a measure of transfers to formal workers.
Informal workers, on the other hand, are beneficiaries of a competing trans-
fer system made up of several unlinked transfer programs that include cash
and in kind transfers. Among the most important, we have Seguro Popular,
which was introduced in 2004. Another example of a sizable program would
be Progresa-Oportunidades, which was introduced in the nineties. In section
6 we provide a quantitative assessment of the introduction of Seguro Popular
on the size of the informal sector.
To obtain the size of transfers, there are easily available data at the ag-
gregate level on the Social Expenditure database of the OECD (SOCX.) This
database reports that total social expenditure was 7.7% of GDP in 2011. This
includes both cash and in kind benefits. However the SOCX database does not
consider how much of transfers accrue to informal workers. Recent work has
focused on documenting the distribution of transfers across income quintiles,
this is an informative statistic as lower income quintiles are associated with
being in the informal sector. Breceda et al. (2008) report that 30% of transfers
are directed to the lowest two income quintiles. An alternative to calculate the
distribution of transfers is to use data from Levy (2008.) He estimates that an
7In the real world, payroll taxes are regressive as they a lump sum component. As a
consquence, the lowest 10% earners pay a similar fraction of their wages than top 10%
earners.
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informal worker gets 5670 MXP out of 24519 MXP, or 23% of total transfers.
We postpone a discussion of the data for Seguro Popular to Section 6.
3 Model
To study the effects of the structure of taxes and transfers in Mexico, we build
a very stylized search model that features employment and unemployment
states by sector, formal and informal, potentially different wage offer distribu-
tions, and different exogenous job creation and job destruction rates8.
The economy is populated with a continuum of risk-neutral workers that
discount consumption streams at a rate β. The model period is a quarter.
Workers are ex-ante identical but face random draws from two different, and
independent, distributions of wage offers. GF is the distribution of wage offers
in the formal sector and GI is the distribution of wage offers in the informal
sector. We abstract from subindex t as we will be analyzing steady state al-
locations. The individual state variables are employment status (employed or
unemployed,) employment sector (formal or informal) and current wage (wF
or wI .) Employed workers face an exogenous sector specific separation proba-
bility, λi where i ∈ {F, I}. At this stage we abstract from on the job search.
Thus, observed transitions from formal to informal employment and vice-versa
include a period of unemployment.
Workers employed in the formal sector have to pay a proportional tax on
wages τwF whereas those employed in the informal sector do not pay taxes.
We keep a very simple structure of transfers in the model. Formal workers
receive a fraction θ of the tax proceeds as a per capita transfer: ΩF , and this
transfer is the same regardless of the employment/unemployment status. We
think of this transfer as the cash value of all cash and in-kind benefits accrued
to formal workers: health insurance, retirement benefits, unemployment in-
8A natural step in our future research would be to extend this model to general equilib-
rium.
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surance, and so on. Informal workers get the remaining fraction 1 − θ of tax
revenue as a per capita transfer ΩI . These may include welfare programs that
are specially targeted to them, such as Seguro Popular and Oportunidades and
we also assume these transfers are the same across employment/unemployment
status.
Every period unemployed workers get a draw from both formal and in-
formal sector wage distributions with independent probabilities qi where i ∈
{F, I}. They must choose whether they remain unemployed or accept any of
the offers at hand9. We write down Bellman Equations that characterize the
decision of workers and lay out an equilibrium definition. For that we need to
characterize the steady state equilibrium level of employment and unemploy-
ment in the formal and informal sectors, and the steady state distributions of
accepted wage offers in both sectors.
3.1 Value functions
The decision problem of an individual is characterized by four Bellman Equa-
tions: the value of being employed in the formal sector with a wage wF ,
VF (wF ), the value of being employed in the informal sector with a wage wI ,
VI(wI), the value of being unemployed in the formal sector with wage wF ,
UF (wF ) and the value of being unemployed from the informal sector with
wage wI , UI(wI)
10
1. Value of being employed in the formal sector:
VF (wF ) = ΩF,e + (1− τ)wF + β [λFUF (wF ) + (1− λF )VF (wF )] (1)
9In a model similar to ours, Bosch & Pretel allow for one offer at a time and quitting.
10The values of unemployment depend on wages only through transfers. If transfers are
independent from wages then values of unemployment are scalars.
10
2. Value of being employed in the informal sector
VI(wI) = ΩI,e + wI + β [λIUI(wI) + (1− λI)VI(wI)] (2)
3. Value of being unemployed in the formal sector
UF (wF ) = ΩF,u + ηwF + β [qF qIEmax {VF (w′F ), VI(w′I), UF (wF )}
+qF (1− qI)Emax {VF (w′F ), UF (wF )}
+ qI(1− qF )Emax {VI(w′I), UF (wF )}+ (1− qF )(1− qI)UF (wF )]
(3)
where η refers to unemployment insurance.
4. Value of being unemployed in the informal sector
UI(wI) = ΩI,u + β [qF qIEmax {VF (w′F ), VI(w′I), UI(wI)}
+qF (1− qI)Emax {VF (w′F ), UI(wI)}
+qI(1− qF )Emax {VI(w′I), UI(wI)}+ (1− qF )(1− qI)UI(wI)]
(4)
where Ωi,j is the transfer that workers in sector i ∈ {F, I} get when his
labor force status is j ∈ {e, u}.
We acknowledge that unemployment benefits are not granted forever. We
solve the model under two cases: unemployment and severance payments
granted forever and when they are given just for the first period. Note that
they can be actuarially adjusted so they have the same present value than
schemes usually found across countries. Bosch & Pretel (2011) solve this issue
by introducing a poisson process for unemployment duration but that would
increase the number of value functions and reservation values to be solved in
equilibrium11.
11Actuarial adjustment would work as follows. Imagine we have a unemployment scheme
that last D periods with potentially different replacement rates η1, ..., ηD. The permanent
value of this scheme will be:
η¯ = (1− β)
D∑
d=1
βd−1Prob(t = d)ηd
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The value functions in equilibrium define reservation wages. These will
be critical in determining equilibrium flows between employment and unem-
ployment in both formal and informal sectors. Note that we will have four
different reservation wages: a reservation wage of a unemployed worker from
formal sector facing an offer from formal sector (wRFF ,) a reservation wage of
a unemployed worker from informal sector facing an offer from formal sector
(wRIF ,) a reservation wage of a unemployed worker from formal sector facing
an offer from informal sector (wRFI) and a reservation wage of a unemployed
worker previously in the informal sector that evaluates an offer in the informal
sector: wRII . To define these reservation wages we use (1) to (4.)
VF
(
wRFF
)
= UF
(
wRFF
)
(5)
VI
(
wRII
)
= UI
(
wRII
)
(6)
VF
(
wRIF
)
= UI
(
wRIF
)
(7)
VI
(
wRFI
)
= UF
(
wRFI
)
(8)
3.2 Steady State Employment, Unemployment andWage
Distributions
With the reservation wages we are able to define the steady state levels of
employment and unemployment and then stationary wage distributions in the
formal and informal sectors. Let eFt be the employment in the formal sector at
date t. Similarly we can define eIt , u
F
t and u
I
t . The evolution of these variables
is driven by reservation wages, distributions of wage offers, and separation and
wage drawing probabilities.
The evolution of these aggregate variables is defined by the following set
of difference equations:
where Prob(t = d) is the probability that unemployment duration t last for d periods, and
can be computed from equilibrium value functions. We are comparing what we get with
different approaches.
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eF,t+1 = (1− λF )eF,t + qF (1− qI) [Prob (VF > UF )uF,t + Prob (VF > UI)uI,t]
+ qF qI [Prob (VF > UF )Prob (VI > UF ))Prob (VF > VI)uF,t
+ Prob (VF > UI))Prob (VI > UI)Prob (VF > VI)uI,t]
eI,t+1 = (1− λI)eI,t + qI(1− qF ) [Prob (VI > UF ))uF,t + Prob (VI > UI)uI,t]
+ qF qI [Prob (VF > UF ))Prob (VI > UF ))Prob (VI > VF )uF,t
+ Prob (VF > UF )Prob (VI > UI)Prob (VI > VF )uI,t]
uF,t+1 = [(1− qF )(1− qI) + qF (1− qI)Prob (VF ≤ UF ) + qI(1− qF )Prob (VI ≤ UF )
+ qF qIProb (VF ≤ UF )Prob (VI ≤ UF )]uF,t + λF eF,t
1 = eF,t+1 + eI,t+1 + uF,t+1 + uI,t+1
Consider the first equation that define employment in the formal sector
next period. The first component is the mass of workers whom did not loose
their formal employment. The second component are those workers that accept
an offer from the formal sector. Finally, we have unemployed workers in the
formal and informal sector that get acceptable offers from both sectors; but
formal sector offer dominates. Second equation follows a similar logic. Third
and forth equations describe the evolution of unemployment in formal and
informal sectors. Consider the third equation. Formal unemployment rate
tomorrow is the sum of those formal workers that do not get an offer, plus
those that get offers but reject them. Finally there is an inflow of workers
that lost their employment in the formal sector. This system of equations
define a steady state for employment and unemployment distributions. Key
to define steady state employment and unemployment by sector in equilibrium
are the probabilities that compare different offers. In the calibration we will
assume log-normality of distributions from where workers draw offers, which
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will make easy to compute these probabilities. As wage draws from formal
and informal sector belong to different log-normal distributions there is not
an analytic solution to Prob(VF > VI). We log-linearize each value function
around its respective mean wage.
VF (wF )|µF −→ N
(
(1− τ)eµF + βλFUF
1− β(1− λF ) ,
[
(1− τ)eµF
1− β(1− λF )
]2
σ2F
)
VI(wI)|µI −→ N
(
eµI + βλIUI
1− β(1− λI) ,
[
eµI
1− β(1− λI)
]2
σ2I
)
VF (wF )|µF − VI(wI)|µI −→ N
(
(1− τ)eµF + βλFUF
1− β(1− λF ) −
eµI + βλIUI
1− β(1− λI) ,[
(1− τ)eµF
1− β(1− λF )
]2
σ2F +
[
eµI
1− β(1− λI)
]2
σ2I
)
We need to define the equilibrium distribution of accepted wage offers.
These can be computed from the primitive distribution of wage offers and
individual behavior. ΓF,t and ΓI,t are equilibrium distributions of accepted
wage offers on each sector:
ΓF,t+1(wF ) = (1− λF )ΓF,t(wF ) + qF qIgF (wF )
[
I(wF > w
R
FF )Pr(VI > UF )
+ Pr(VF (wF ) > VI)uF,t + I(wF > w
R
IF )Pr(VI > UI)Pr(VF (wF ) > VI)uI,t
+ I(wF > w
R
FF )Pr(VI < UF )uF,t + I(wF > w
R
IF )Pr(VI < UI)uI,t
]
+ qF (1− qI)
[
I(wF > w
R
FF )uF,t + I(wF > w
R
IF )uI,t
]
14
ΓI,t+1(wI) = (1− λI)ΓI,t(wI) + qF qIgF (wF )
[
I(wI > w
R
FI)Pr(VI > UF )
+ Pr(VI(wI) > VF )uF,t + I(wI > w
R
II)Pr(VF > UI)Pr(VI(wI) > VF )uI,t
+ I(wI > w
R
FI)Pr(VF < UF )uF,t + I(wI > w
R
II)Pr(VF < UI)uI,t
]
+ qF (1− qI)
[
I(wI > w
R
FI)uF,t + I(wI > w
R
II)uI,t
]
Each of the equations define a steady state measure of accepted wage offers:
ΓF and ΓI . We normalize the measure of workers in the economy to one
12.
The steady state equilibrium transfer system can be defined as:
Ω + η
∫
wFdΓF = τ
∫
wFdΓF (wF )uF
which tells us that total resources collected by the government equal total
transfers Ω plus what is spent on unemployment insurance. Note that Ω =
ΩF,e + ΩF,u + ΩI,e + ΩI,u. We assume that ΩF = θΩ and Ωi,j = Ωi
ji
ui+ei
where
i ∈ {F, I} and i ∈ {e, u}
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model by choosing parameters and simulating until we are
close to some key moments from Section 2. All parameters but θ are found
trough simulations. We set θ = .7 based on the discussion of Section 2.
The parameters we need to calibrate are job firing probabilities, job finding
probabilities, and means and standard deviations of wage distributions both
in formal and informal sectors. We also set transfers Ω so that in equilibrium
the size of taxes and transfers equals 7% of GDP in the model economy. We
12This implies that
∫
dΓi(wi) = ei where i ∈ {F, I}
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assume that wage offers of formal and informal sectors are drawn from i.i.d.
log-normal distributions with potentially different mean and variance
log(wi)→ N(µi, σ2i ) where i ∈ {F, I}
This gives us nine parameters to calibrate that we collect in the vector
ϕ = (λF , λI , qF , qI , µF , µI , σF , σI , τ)
We chose the vector of parameters that minimized the mean squared percent
deviation from the moments selected. The statistics we choose are the fraction
of employees in the formal sector eˆF , the fraction of employees in the infor-
mal sector eˆI , total unemployment uˆ, unemployment in the informal sector
uˆI , mean wage in the formal sector w¯F , mean wage in the informal sector w¯I ,
the standard deviation of wages in the formal sector σF , the standard devi-
ation of wages in the informal sector σI and the share of transfers of GDP
Tr
y
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The following table shows the vector of parameters that minimized the
mean squared deviation of the simulated moments to their ENOE equivalents
Firing probability in the formal sector is smaller than in the informal sector.
Table 3. Calibrated Parameters
λF λI qF qI µF µI σF σF Ω
.0233 .0348 .3314 .9116 2.8096 2.0596 .9254 1.0593 3.6908
This is what we expected as the formal sector in mexico is subject to high
severance payments. Similarly, job finding probabilities are smaller in the for-
mal sector than in the informal sector. Mean wages in the formal sector are
bigger than mean wages in the informal sector. We also expect this result but
when we compare wages in the formal sector relative to wages in the informal
sector in the data and the model we observe that the informality gap close by
7.35pp. We interpret this result as informal sector not being as unproductive
13In our model y =
∫
wF dΓF +
∫
wIdΓI
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relative to the formal sector as what would have measured from raw data. This
parameters should be interpreted carefully until we have a general equilibrium
version of the model, where job finding and job destruction probabilities will
be endogenously given and we will be able to back up productivities.
These estimated parameters induce the following moments that we compare
to those in the data in the next table.
Table 4. Fit of Moments
eF eI u uI w¯F w¯I σF σI
Tr
y
Data .42 .54 .04 .02 31.69 21.06 31.63 24.04 .07
Model .4198 .5385 .0417 .0274 31.38 21.32 31.75 24.04 .07
The model provides a good match of employment and unemployment. It
is also very accurate in capturing the first two moments of the observed dis-
tribution of wages. It also gives a decent approximation to wage inequality
in Mexico. OECD reports a Gini coefficient around .45. Our model’s Gini
coefficient is .4268 for formal workers and .4338 for informal workers. This is
not surprising as we are targeting mean and standard deviation in formal and
informal sectors, and the distribution of wages in the data is likely log-normal.
However, since the fit of moments is good we can be relatively confident when
we simulate different policy changes that we will be doing comparative statics
with current Mexican economy as a benchmark.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of accepted wage offers in the formal (a) and
informal sectors (b). We observe substantial differences between ex-ante and
ex-post distributions. Selection into formal and informal employment tilts the
distribution of accepted wage offers to the right of the ex-ante distribution of
wage offers.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Wages in the Formal and Informal Sector
(a) Formal Sector (b) Informal Sector
5 Policy Simulations
In this section we analyze three policy reforms: changing generosity of the
transfers system, changing distribution of transfers between formal and in-
formal workers and the introduction of unemployment insurance for formal
workers, which is one proposal in the policy agenda of Mexico current govern-
ment.
5.1 Changes in Distribution of Transfers
We will keep taxes constant at the benchmark level of 28%14 but change the
distribution of transfers between formal and informal workers. Starting from
the benchmark assumption in which formal workers get all the transfers when
they become unemployed, we increase the share that informal workers get from
the transfer system.
Dividing transfers equally between formal and informal workers increases
the share of the informal sector by 5pp compared to the benchmark economy
where the share of transfers is 70-30, as we can see in Table 5. Analyzing this
14This is the tax rate that in equilibrium delivers a ratio of transfers to GDP of 7%
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policy reform is relevant because it is similar to universalization of social15,
another topic currently discussed in Mexico nowadays. Note that this policy
will reduce unemployment in the formal sector as less workers will be queuing
in formal unemployment to get a formal sector offer, at the cost of increasing
unemployment in the informal sector. However, total unemployment is neutral
to this policy change.
Table 5. Changes in Distribution
θ 1 .8 .7 .5 .3 .1
eF .4804 .4415 .4201 .3743 .3255 .2729
eI .4778 .5167 .5381 .5840 .6330 .6858
uF .0168 .0152 .0143 .0125 .0106 .0087
uI .0250 .0266 .0274 .0291 .0308 .0326
w¯F 29.2730 30.5928 31.3592 33.1567 35.3265 38.0977
w¯I 22.6091 21.7752 21.3356 20.4669 19.6015 18.7510
σF 30.9929 31.4525 31.7271 32.3863 33.2225 34.3495
σI 24.7815 24.2944 24.0374 23.5214 23.0024 22.4818
Changing the distribution of transfers has effects on the wage distribution
as well, changing the distribution of accepted wage offers in both formal and
informal sectors. The whole effect in our model goes through changes in reser-
vation wages. We observe a rise in formal sector mean wages and its dispersion,
whereas informal mean wages drop, increasing the informality gap.
5.2 Changes in the Generosity of the Transfers
We will change the size of the transfer system to make it 50% less generous
and 50% more generous than the benchmark generosity. As we are imposing a
balanced budget this is equivalent to changing the tax rate on wages too, in the
same proportion. The effects of increasing the size of the transfer system are
15It is similar because the benchmark economy delivers 50% of workers in the informal
sector
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Figure 2. Changes in Distribution of Transfers and Distribution of Wages
(a) Formal Sector
(b) Informal Sector
small for the distribution of employment and unemployment, conditional on
the distribution of transfers. This gives us a clear policy prescription: chang-
ing distribution of tax and transfer programs between formal and informal
sectors is much more effective than increasing its generosity given the bench-
mark distribution of transfers. However, it would be most effective shifting
the distribution of transfers to the formal sector while radically increasing its
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generosity.
Table 6. Changes in Generosity
Ω .5 .8 1 1.3 1.5
eF .4311 .4248 .4201 .4115 .4059
eI .5262 .5330 .5381 .5474 .5533
uF .0151 .0147 .0143 .0138 .0134
uI .0276 .0275 .0274 .0274 .0273
w¯F 31.3272 31.3455 31.3592 31.4120 31.4336
w¯I 21.8378 21.5442 21.3356 21.0070 20.8318
σF 31.5620 31.6491 31.7271 31.8967 32.0454
σI 24.2164 24.1156 24.0374 23.8950 23.8011
This does not mean that changes in generosity for different distributions of
taxes and transfers would have a big effect on the size of the informal sector.
Figure 3 illustrate this fact.
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5.3 Unemployment Insurance
In this section we introduce unemployment insurance as a replacement rate
η of average wages in the formal sector. We vary replacement rate from 0
to 200% of average wages. To study the importance of giving unemployment
insurance for a long period of time versus a short period of time we make two
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extreme assumptions: unemployment insurance lasts for one period and un-
employment insurance lasts for as long as you are unemployed. These policies
imply minor changes on the value functions of unemployment but does not
change the structure of the model described in previous sections.
We can see that unemployment insurance has relatively small effects on the
size of the formal sector. This is due to the fact that the relative size of this
program over the pre-existing tax and transfer system is relatively small. We
have to take this result carefully as we are not dealing with general equilibrium
effects. We are also abstracting from perverse incentives that would encourage
workers to claim benefits when they are laid off from the formal sector, while
working in the informal sector.
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6 The case of Seguro Popular
In this section, we illustrate our main results using the case of the recently in-
troduced “Seguro Popular” in Mexico. Seguro Popular is a program designed
to provide health services to people not covered by the traditional social secu-
rity system. The introduction of “Seguro Popular” represents a huge increase
in the transfers devoted to informal workers, taking into account that the share
of social transfers over GDP did not increase dramatically for Mexico.
22
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0.014
0.0145
0.015
0.0155
0.016
0.0165
0.017
0.0175
0.018
0.0185
0.019
Replacement Rate
U
n
e
m
p
lo
ym
en
t 
Fo
rm
al
 S
ec
to
r
UI as % of Average Wages
 
 
Short Term
Long Term
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Replacement Rate
Sh
ar
e 
of
 U
I 
on
 B
ud
ge
t
UI as % of Average Wages
 
 
Short Term
Long Term
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0.27
0.275
0.28
0.285
0.29
0.295
0.3
0.305
0.31
0.315
0.32
Replacement Rate
T
a
x
 
R
a
t
e
UI as % of Average Wages
 
 
Short Term
Long Term
23
Figure 3. Affiliation to Seguro Popular
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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Source: Sistema de Proteccion Social en Salud. Informe de Resultados 2012.
The program was gradually introduced in Mexico starting in 2004 and reach-
ing its potential in 2012. Figure 3 shows the evolution of affiliation to the
system. In particular, the figure shows the cumulative number of persons reg-
istered each year as a fraction of the total number of persons registered in
2012, which is the maximum number possible. As it is clear from the figure,
at the beginning of 2009 more than 50% of potential affiliation had already
taken place, and by the end of 2010 82% was enrolled. Thus, in 2009 the size of
the program was already sufficiently large to affect the incentives of Mexican
workers.
As a result of the introduction of Seguro Popular, government health spend-
ing increased from 2.6% of GDP to 3.1% in the period. But more importantly,
the composition of expenditures across the formal and informal sectors changed
(See Figure 4). Government spending on health programs devoted to informal
workers increased from 32% of total spending in 2004 to 45% in 2011. Thus,
the size of aggregate transfers is now more or less the same across the formal
and informal sectors.
We find similar trends when we measure variables in per capita terms.
Per capita spending on formal workers and their families has remained fairly
constant since 2000, while spending directed to informal workers has increased.
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Figure 4. Informal/Formal Government Health Expenditure Ratio
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Data source: Ministry of Health .
In 2004, for each peso spent on health services directed to informal workers
and their families, the government spent 2.4 pesos on health directed to formal
workers and their families. In 2011 this ratio was only 1.5 pesos16.
Is there any evidence in the data that this change in the size and dis-
tribution of taxes and transfers has induced changes in informality and/or
unemployment? To answer this question we look at time series data of these
two variables and the cyclical component of GDP. These are presented in Fig-
ures 5, 6, 7 and 8. Figure 5 presents the share of informality among employees
and Figure 6 the share of informality among all workers. Notice that both
measures of informality increase in 2009 and stay high until 2012. The in-
crease in 2009 can be attributed, at least partially, to the severe contraction
that the Mexican economy experienced that year. Nonetheless, informality has
stayed high since then, while GDP has returned to trend. Something similar
has happened to unemployment as illustrated in Figure 7. Nonetheless, in the
case of unemployment, there exists a clear trend (Figure 8). If “Seguro Popu-
lar” had an impact on unemployment, this should be picked up by changes in
the trend. The slope of this trend decreases in 2004, increases in 2007, and is
16The source of this data is the Mexican Ministry of Health (Secretaria de Salud)
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Figure 5. Evolution of informality among employees
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Source: Own calculation using ENE, ENOE and National Accounts.
Table 7. Data on distribution and generosity of transfers associated to the
introduction of Seguro Popular
Data 2004 2011
Health Spending / GDP (Generosity) 2.59 3.05
Share of spending directed to formal workers (Distribution) 0.6756 0.5567
reduced again in 2011; thus, we don’t see a clear change in trend in the period
in which the program was introduced.
We proceed to use our model to quantitatively assess the impact of Seguro
Popular. To do this, we use data on government health expenditures before
and after the introduction of Seguro Popular. We calibrate the model to the
data on health expenditures in 2011 after the program was fully introduced.
Then, we simulate in the model a reduction in generosity of 15% along with
a change in the distribution of transfers towards formal workers (see Table 7).
The new steady state would correspond to the situation before the introduction
of the program.
The results are presented in Table 8. Our model predicts that the impact
of Seguro Popular was to increase the share of informality in 1.65 percentage
points. This result is consistent with previous literature that has reported a
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Figure 6. Evolution of informality among all workers
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Source: Own calculation using ENE, ENOE and National Accounts.
small effect of the introduction of this program on informality (Azuara and
Marinescu (2011) and Campos (2011,) among others). Our model also predicts
a small reduction in the unemployment rate of only 0.005pp. We believe that
this is consistent with the evolution of unemployment in Figure 8, in particu-
lar, with the fact that there has been no clear changes in trend.
The small changes found as a result of the introduction of SP are the result
of their small size relative to the value of work and unemployment. Thus, a
lesson from this exercise is that in order to obtain big changes in informality,
transfers should be much bigger. However the purpose of this exercise is not to
study the impact of Seguro Popular on informal labor markets but to address
whether our model is able to quantitatively predict well documented changes
in the structure of tax and transfer programs in Mexico. Given that, our
model predicts substantial effects on the size of the informal sector for radical
changes to the structure of tax and transfer programs.
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Figure 7. Evolution of unemployment
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Figure 8. Unemployment trend
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Table 8. Impact of the introduction of Seguro Popular in informality and
unemployment
Without Seguro Popular With Seguro Popular Difference
eI 0.5224 0.5389 0.0165
u 0.0425 0.042 -0.0005
uF 0.0156 0.0148 -0.0008
uI 0.0269 0.0273 0.0004
7 Conclusion
We have built a search model that features four different labor market states
to capture the choice of workers to be employed in the formal or informal sec-
tors. As a consequence of their choice and current tax and transfers system,
unemployment also depends on the sector they were spelled from.
We calibrate the model to Mexican data because of its relative quality, but
our model may apply to other countries too. A very simple specification of
the model is able to match accurately key statistics of the Mexican economy.
With the calibrated version of the model we perform several simulation exer-
cises to quantify the effects of tax and transfers policies aimed to increase the
value of formality. These policies are now in the center of a vivid policy debate.
First, we find that increasing the share of transfers that flow into informal
workers, while keeping total transfers fixed, increases the size of the informal
sector in an important way: the range of variation is of 19 percentage points.
Second, we find that increasing the generosity of the taxes and transfers system
reduces the formal sector -since it bears the entire tax burden-, but it does so
in a less drastic way than in the case where we only change the distribution of
transfers: the range of variation in the size of informality is only 5 percentage
points as a result of this change in policy. Third, when we simultaneously
change both, the size and the distribution of transfers, we find a potential
range of variation of 51 percentage points. This implies that the informal
sector can be drastically reduced through changing the structure of the tax
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and transfer system. Specifically, reducing the size of the informal sector may
be achieved by increasing taxes and transfers, as long as these transfers are
allocated to formal workers only.
We believe that this result is important in the light of recent discussion in
Latin American countries where the elimination of the traditional social se-
curity system is being considered as a way to reduce informality. Our results
suggest the opposite: that allocating more resources to the traditional social
security system is an effective way to increase formalization, even if those extra
resources come from higher taxes to formal workers. Moreover, our analysis
implies that this process can be done without reducing the value of the trans-
fers already received by informal workers.
One last lesson from our analysis is that in order to obtain large changes
in informality, the size of transfers is crucial. As an example, we analyzed
the case of the introduction of Seguro Popular in Mexico, where the distribu-
tion of public health spending towards informal workers increased from 30%
to 45% of total public spending. We showed that despite this large change
in the distribution of transfers, the effect on informality is small because the
size of the health spending transfers is small relative to the value of jobs and
unemployment. This should not be interpreted negatively, as using a well
documented change in the structure of tax and transfer programs, our model
is quantitatively accurate. Therefore, radical changes in the structure of tax
and transfer programs in countries with high informality may reduce the size
of the informal sector substantially. It is left for future research whether our
model is consistent with cross country evidence.
Our model is amenable to extensions in some dimensions. Top in our
research agenda is introducing education, as the response of workers to changes
in taxes and transfers may be substantially different for people with different
academic degrees. We also believe that we can learn more from extending our
model to general equilibrium.
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